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Cybersemiotics:  A New Foundation for Transdisciplinary Theory of 




We need to realize that a paradigm based on the view of the universe that 
makes irreversible time and evolution fundamental, forces us to view man as a 
product of evolution and therefore an observer from inside the universe. This 
changes the way we conceptualize the problem and role of consciousness in 
nature compared to what Descartes did with his dualistic paradigm. The theory 
of evolution forces us theoretically to conceive the natural and social sciences 
as well as the humanities together in one framework of unrestricted or 
absolute naturalism, where consciousness is part of nature. This has influenced 
the exact sciences to produce theories of information and self-organization in 
order to explain the origin of life and sense experiences, encouraged biological 
thinking to go into psychology and social science in the form of theories of 
selfish genes, socio-biology and evolutionary psychology. But these approaches 
have still not satisfactorily led to an understanding of why and how certain 
systems have the ability to produce sense experiences, awareness and 
meaningful communication. The theories of the phenomenological life world 
and the hermeneutics of communication and understanding seem to defy 
classical scientific explanations. The humanities therefore send another insight 
the opposite way down the evolutionary ladder, with questions like: What is 
the role of consciousness, signs and meaning in evolution? These are matters 
that the exact sciences are not constructed to answer in their present state.  
Phenomenology and hermeneutics point out to the sciences that they have 
prerequisite conditions in embodied living conscious being imbued with 
meaningful language and a culture. One can see the world view that emerges 
from the work of the sciences as a reconstruction back into time of our present 
ecological and evolutionary self-understanding as semiotic intersubjective 
conscious cultural historical creatures, but unable to handle the aspects of 
meaning and conscious awareness. How can we integrate these two directions 
of explanatory efforts? The problem is that the scientific one is without 
concepts of qualia and meaning, and the phenomenological-hermeneutic 
“sciences of meaning” do not have a foundation of material evolution. A 
modern interpretation of C.S. Peirce’s pragmaticistic evolutionary and 
phaneroscopic semiosis in the form of a biosemiotics is used and integrated 
with N. Luhmann’s evolutionary autopoietic system theory of social 
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communication. This framework, which integrates cybernetics and semiotics, is 
called Cybersemiotics. 
 
Semiotics, science and common sense 
Inspired by critical realism and Bourdieus’ methodology I believe that we only 
know the surface of reality, and that it is the task of the sciences to dig deeper 
and look wider than where our common sense knowledge has developed to at 
the present stage. Furthermore with Gadamer (1989) I do believe that our 
cultural history is also a development of our knowledge about ourselves, society 
and nature expanding to a common knowledge horizon. Thus the whole scientific 
endeavour is to further that development of self- and nature- understanding and 
knowledge, which I from a biological evolutionary perspective conceive, has the 
purpose of being a management for the betterment of survival of the species 
and an attractive meaningful life. 
 
Therefore I agree with Karl Popper that it is the role of great scientist and 
philosophers to boldly invent new ways of looking at reality, knowledge and 
ourselves. As it was done for instance by Einstein and Bohr when they changed 
our views on matter, energy, time, space and knowledge forever in a profound 
way, or when Norbert Wiener introduced information as a basic ontological 
component in his transdisciplinary cybernetic world view. I view semiotic 
philosopher C. S. Peirce as such a bold inventor, who had ideas close to both 
Popper and Bhaskar, when we come to philosophy of science. But he created a 
whole architectonic of semiotic philosophy, which includes a transdiscipinary 
theory of meaning, signification and communication. 
 
What Peirce attempted was to change our worldview in order to encompass the 
world of science and logic with the world of meaning and communication into a 
common framework through a triadic evolutionary pragmaticist theory of 
semiotics. This new but partly unfinished approach has attracted many 
researchers to make a consistent interpretation of his scattered work. See for 
instance Apel (1981), Boler(1963), Brent (1998) Colapietro (1989), Corrington, R. 
(1993), Fisch (1986), Deledalle, G. (2000), Esposito(1980), Hookway (1992), 
Liszka, J. J. (1996), Menand, L. (2001), Parker (1998), Savan D. (1987-1988), Short 
(2007). 
 
Many researchers, among them Karl-Otto Apel (1981)1 and Jürgen Habermas 
(1987) (with a somewhat strange interpretation)2, have been attracted by 
                                                 
1
 From the book cover I quote this precise characterization: ”As a mediation between theory and 
praxis, Apel presents pragmatism as the major rival to both existentialism and Marxism, the two 
other responses to the Hegelian aftermath. In the same context, Apel demonstrates the importance 
of Peirce's conceptual breakthroughs, in the theory of signs (semiotics) and the theory of 
rationality, for the challenges and possibilities of a critical theory of society. The contemporary 
developments of the Frankfurt School, in its third generation now, cannot be understood without 
Apel's appropriations of Peirce for a grounding of a critical theory of society as formulated in this 
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Peirce’s radically new way of thinking, and it has made a great impression on 
what became the Copenhagen School of biosemiotics and its members Jesper 
Hoffmeyer, Claus Emmeche, Frederik Stjernfelt and Søren Brier.. The that has 
given it a biological reinterpretation of the life phenomenon view is well 
summarized in Jesper Hoffmeyer’s books (Hoffmeyer 1996 and 2008), Donald 
Favareau (2010) collection of “Essential Readings in Biosemiotics” and as part of 
Brier’s Cybersemiotics (Brier 2008). In cybersemiotics I integrate Peircean 
biosemiotics with cybernetic view of information into a new transdisciplinary 
framework based on triadic semiotics and an ontology of emptiness. It is an 
attempt to produce a transdisciplinary view that solve C.P. Snows two culture 
problem. The proposed framework is developing an integrative multi- and 
transdisciplinary theory of the complex area of  cybernetics information science 
for nature and machine plus the semiotics of all living systems cognition, 
communication, and culture, with meaning as the overarching topic. It is an 
integrated transdisciplinary, philosophy of science, and semiotics meta-level 
from where to monitor our multidisciplinary research endeavor. What is still the 
problem for the sciences is the phenomenon of meaning and how that can 
develop from an informational world. The background of this project is the 
recognition that Western philosophy of science and sciences find themselves in a 
                                                                                                                                     
systematic reconstruction of modern philosophy. This work is also crucial for an understanding of 
Apel's own philosophical project of a transcendental pragmatics, or semiotics. With the revival of 
Peirce studies, and the rediscovery of the pragmatist tradition in American philosophical thinking, 
this study articulates a very contemporary and relevant interpretation that may challenge and even 
go against the grain of many so-called Neopragmatists.” 
2
 Habermas observes that  the insight  helping Peirce avoiding  positivism was “his understanding 
that the task of methodology is not to clarify the logical structure of scientific theories but the logic 
of the procedure with whose aid we obtain scientific theories” (ibid.). It enabled Peirce to arrive at 
his crucial insight that: We term information scientific if and only if an uncompelled and 
permanent consensus can be obtained with regard to its validity. This consensus does not have to 
be definitive, but has to have definitive agreement as its goal. The genuine achievement of modern 
science does not consist primarily in producing true theories that are correct and cogent statements 
about what we call reality. Rather, it distinguishes itself from traditional categories of knowledge 
by a method of arriving at an uncompelled and permanent consensus of this sort about our views. 
But Habermas thinks that, Peirce does not go far enough to be able to overcome the 
correspondence theory of truth completely. He ultimately succumbs to the same objectivist illusion 
because of his contradictory notion that the uncompelled consensus among inquirers aims at 
technical control. Habermas writes. 
“The symbolic representation of matters of fact knowable from the transcendental perspective of 
possible technical control serves exclusively for the transformation of expression in process of 
reasoning. Deduction, induction, and abduction establish relations between statements that are in 
principle monologic. It is possible to think in syllogism, but not to conduct a dialogue in them. I 
can use syllogistic reasoning to yield arguments for a discussion, but I cannot argue syllogistically 
with another. Insofar as the employment of symbols is constitutive for the behavioural system of 
instrumental action, the use of language involved is monologic. But the communication of 
investigators requires the use of language that is not confined to limits of technical control over 
objectified natural process. It arises from symbolic interaction between societal subjects who 
reciprocally know and recognise each other as unmistakeable individuals. This communicative 
action is a system of reference that cannot be reduced to the framework of instrumental action 
(Habermas 1987: 137).”  (based on Ali Rizvi:  
http://habermasians.blogspot.com/2005/01/habermas-on-peirce-1.html). Strange interpretation as 
even the self is dialogical in Peirce’ssemiotics that again depends on the development of a web of 
signs getting their meaning from intersubjektive social meaningful practise. 
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state of crisis.  Western culture stands in a watershed when it comes to taking 
the final step into a knowledge culture based on information and communication 
technology. Rather than basing our culture on the conception of an abstract un-
embodied, globally available (artificial, impersonal) intelligence of information 
programs as the highest goal of knowledge; we believe that we should ground 
our culture(s) on human embodied localized, living, creative personal as well as 
interpersonal semiotic intelligence, as part of both living nature  and human 
culture. 
 
Current, dominant objectivist science, including physicalism, eliminative 
materialism, and cognitive sciences based on the information processing 
paradigm, including (second order) cybernetics, cannot encompass self-aware 
consciousness and social-communicative meaning as causal agents in nature. 
Current cognitive science attempts to explain human communication from 
outside, without recognizing the phenomenological and hermeneutical aspects 
of existence. Its conception of human (meaningful) language and communication 
as a sort of culturally developed program for social information processing 
between computational brains/minds cannot explain the evolution of embodied 
consciousness and human (meaningful) language and communication in its. In 
order to ground the transdisciplinary model in a new ontology that can 
encompass the ontologies of all four dimensions or spheres. This is what I find 
attractive by C.S. Peirce’s pragmaticist evolutionary semiotic process philosophy. 
Here semiotic social interaction between embodied minds in nature and culture 
is viewed as the central process of knowledge production.  
 
C.S. Peirce’s triadic, evolutionary, realist pragmaticist semiotics 
It was Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), who developed a paradigm, based on 
a similar concept of chaos as Prigogine’s, (Prigogine and Stengers1995) where 
chaos is fundamental to an evolutionary view of the creative universe3. But 
Piece’s theory is intersubjective and phenomenological4 and those both different 
from Prigogine’s evolutionary conceptions and from Husserl’s individually 
oriented phenomenology, which does not have evolution in its foundational 
conceptions. Peirce calls his phenomenology - which differs from Husserl’s 
among other things exactly on this semiotic intersubjective foundation - for 
phaneroscophy. As Peirce begins with observation and intersubjectivity, he 
further denies that we have a special ability for introspection behind language 
                                                 
3
 I do not have space here to go deeper into the work of George Spencer-Brown and how close 
some of his basic intuitions are to Peirce’s triadic semiotics. But see Brier (2009a and b.) for this 
work, which also – like Brier (2008a) – goes deeper into the analysis of second order cybernetics, 
autopoiesis and the way Niklas Luhmann’s work on communication manages to integrate these 
two paradigms with Bateson’s into  a grander system theoretical synthetic work. 
4
 I am not going to very specific in my Peirce exegeses here as I have written extensively on it in 
my book and the papers mentioned in the references. Thus you get a summary of the interpretation 
I have worked up so far. 
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and our embodied sign games. All of our knowledge is intersubjective and the 
dichotomy of internal/external is not foundational for Peirce, though is useful in 
other connections. Even our own phaneroscopic self is for Peirce a sort of sign 
that has developed through our whole life summing up and structuring all our 
experience into - what he in his terminology calls - a symbol (Colapietro 1989). 
Peirce views the universe in another of his signs types, namely as a grand 
argument, which we are trying to decipher. 
The heart of the Peircean phaneroscophy is his system of categories. They are 
basic to the understanding of his theory of signs and indeed of his thought as a 
whole. They are a unique critique and development of Kant’s categories that laid 
the foundation of modern philosophy and philosophy of science. 
Peirce’s On a new list of categories (Peirce, CP 1.551) presents his categories as 
distilled from the logical analysis of thought and regarded as applicable to being, 
but Peirce also has a phenomenological analysis leading to his phaneroscophy as 
we shall see below. His forerunners and idols are Aristotle and Kant. Aristotle 
listed ten categories and Kant twelve. Inspired by Kant, Peirce searches for the 
basic categories behind the semiotic knowledge dynamics, and finds them 
through extensive analysis over long time. Peirce finds that there are three and 
only three categories basic categories that are part of all kinds of cognition 
(Colapietro 1989). This is an aspect of Peirce’s theory that is distinct from 
Husserl’s. Peirce sees that meaning and interpretation cannot be reduced to less 
than three categories, like for instance it is done in Saussure’s (1969/1916) 
structuralist and dualistic semiology, which does not deal with the reference to 
some kind of external reality outside language. It only deals with internal 
differences in the semiotic and linguistic systems. But Peirce’s semiotics is a 
realistic theory and so much more as we shall see (Fisch 1986 and Boler 1963).  
These three categories he has found are so general that he called them: 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. The most difficult of the categories to 
discuss is Firstness, which is, among other things, the category of pure feeling. 
Peirce writes that Firstness is 
“an instance of that kind of consciousness which involves no analysis, 
comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in part of any 
act by which one stretch of consciousness is distinguished from another, which 
has its own positive quality which consists in nothing else, and which is of itself 
all that it is, however it may have been brought about; so that if this feeling is 
present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and equally present at every moment 
of that time . . .. A feeling, then, is not an event, a happening, a coming to pass 
. . . a feeling is a state, which is in its entirety in every moment of time as long as 
it endures.” (Peirce CP1.306). 
The categories are Peirce’s suggestion for a new and broader epistemological 
and ontological paradigmatic framework. Thus they have far-reaching 
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consequences for his ontology, theory of knowledge and semiotics. He writes, in 
his further explanation Secondness and the difference between that and 
Firstness: 
 
“Indeterminacy, then, or pure firstness, and hæcceity5, or pure secondness, are 
facts not calling for and not capable of explanation. Indeterminacy affords us 
nothing to ask a question about; hæcceity is the ultimate ratio, the brutal fact 
that will not be questioned. But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for 
an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that 
sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a 
regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate 
purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that 
very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. … Despair is insanity. 
…We must therefore be guided by the rule of hope, and consequently we must 
reject every philosophy or general conception of the universe, which could ever 
lead to the conclusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must 
look forward to the explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing 
whatever.”  (Peirce, CP 1.405) 
 
This last description of the regularity and intelligibility of things and events is the 
category of Thirdness that connects the potentiality of Firstness and the single 
brute facts or that which make resistance in our measurement in the world, 
which he calls Secondness. Peirce underlines that one needs to accept Thirdness 
if one believes that any kind of general explanation – and therefore science – is 
possible. To know anything there must be a potentiality, but also hæcceity as an 
unexpected (as Spencer-Brown and Luhmann would say) perturbation of (the 
autopoietic system) in form of a difference. When we realize that the difference 
has some regular relation to something else, we interpret it as having meaning in 
our life (the difference makes a difference). Peirce is inventing a relational 
process logic that puts his thinking quite close to Whitehead’s Process and 
Reality (1978).  
 
Thus we see the original fact as information of some kind of regularity of an 
object (physical, psychological or sociological) and we make an interpretant in 
our consciousness. The triadic connection is what emerges as a sign! The sign is a 
connection between a Representamen (a possible sign vehicle) and an Object 
(which can be almost anything including an idea or the movement of a hand) and 
an Interpretation of let’s say the hand movement, which we interpret as a 
greeting. Thus the hand moving has an independent existence as an object, but it 
has the potentiality of being a sign; namely the hand waving of the cultural 
invention of greeting we call ‘hello’. This turns this object into a Representamen 
and the real object, to which it refers, is shown to be ‘a greeting’ and the 
Interpretant to be ‘he greets me because he knows me/recognizes me and 
                                                 
5
 Suchness understood as the brute appearance of force, will and resistance between two 
phenomena. 
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confirms our relationship’. Thus Peirce’s triadic semiotics is built on the internal 
dynamical processes of the three categories and as such inseparable from them6 
like Hegel’s dialectics which was also an inspiration for Peirce. 
Most researchers find the categories hard to understand. I think it is because 
they change the view of the world and knowledge in order to make the 
connection between mind, matter, meaning and logic in what he calls 
pragmaticism. Peirce is close to Whitehead’s process philosophy, except that 
Peirce gives his theory the form of a semiotics. But Whitehead agrees about the 
necessity of metaphysical categories. In Process and Reality Whitehead (1978) 
defends a position very close to Peirce's own. He writes: 
Philosophy will not regain its proper status until the gradual 
elaboration of categorial schemes, definitely stated at each stage of 
progress, is recognized as its proper objective. There may be rival 
schemes, inconsistent among themselves; each with its own merits 
and its own failures. It will then be the purpose of research to 
conciliate the differences. Metaphysical categories are not 
dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentative 
formulations of the ultimate generalities.  
                                                                                     (Whitehead l978:8) 
Peirce is the father of the American Pragmatism, but later in protest of the way 
his friend William James developed this paradigm, he reinvented it as 
Pragmaticism (Fisch 1986).  The basic problem for many is also that he connects - 
what we usually think of as the external and the internal world -through his 
categories – as if there was a Möbius band between them. The Möbius band 
seems to have two sides, but actually only has one continuous side. Peirce’s 
semiotic philosophy draws part of its transdisciplary potential from being 
philosophy of continua or plenary or fields on which we shall return. 
 
The basic ontological foundation in Peirce’s philosophy is Thycism. This 
ontological conception sees chance and chaos as basic characteristics of 
Firstness. This is combined with an evolutionary theory of mind (Agapism), 
where mind has a tendency to form habits in nature. Chaos and chance is seen as 
a First, which is not to be explained further (for instance, by regularities). 
Thirdness is the basis of habit forming and evolution. The chaos of Firstness is 
not seen as the lack of law, as it is in mechanicism and rationalism, but as 
something full of potential qualities to be manifested individually in Secondness 
and as general habits and knowledge in dynamic objects and semiosis in 
Thirdness. 
                                                 
6
 I write this because I often meet researchers who like Peirce’s semiotics but not his categories 
and think they can get the one without the other. I do not think that it possible unless they define 
another foundation that can explain the dynamics. 




Peirce thus uses the concept of Firstness to connect foundational consciousness 
as a pure chaos of feeling and qualia with a tendency to take habits through 
evolution. Thus he agrees with Prigogine and many others - for instance the 
quantum field theory’s idea of a vacuum field with virtual particles - about an 
original chaos of potential forms. The ontology is somewhere between Plato and 
Aristotle. In Peirce’s semiotic philosophy the forms are only potential; they are 
not there as such in the transcendental or in the things in themselves in a 
dualism of form and matter and furthermore in contrast to both Plato and 
Aristotle, Peirce thinks evolutionary. But he shares Aristotle’s view of matter as 
continuous hylé, which is somehow potentially alive in side! Mind and matter is 
on different end of a continuum! He this opposes to Descartes’ absolute 
ontological dualism. 
 
Many researchers consider his world view, even though it is a form of realism, to 
be a kind of objective idealism, with certain characteristics in common with 
Hegel’s dialectically developing spirit (Boler 1963). Peirce’s triadic semiotics has 
some of the same role as Hegel’s dialectics in describing evolution and certain 
principles for its development. But it is a semiotics he develops, not a dialectics. 
There is no ‘Aufhebung’ and thesis-antithesis fighting each other to produce a 
new level of synthesis. Peirce writes on the difference between Hegel’s and his 
own philosophy the following, 
 
“Hegel, in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived, 
…brought out the three elements much more clearly [than Kant did]; but 
the element of Secondness, of hard fact, is not accorded its due place in his 
system; and in a lesser degree the same is true of Firstness.”  (Peirce CP 
1.425) 
 
One of Peirce’ answers to the problems of Hegel’s idea of an objective idealistic 
theory of evolution based on the dialectical internal dynamism were his idea of 
hyperbolic evolution. He has formulated in a very concentrated way in a letter to 
Christine Ladd-Franklin, On Cosmology, which makes it possible for us to present 
the theory in overview by his own hand if you keep in mind the basic concepts 
that I have already presented: In this he also present a new foundational 
element in his ontology namely a concept of emptiness or nothingness as 
something being “before” and “below” the world of the three categories and 
time and space: 
“…my cosmology. …is that the evolution of the world is hyperbolic, that is, 
proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, to a different state of 
things in the infinite future. The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, 
tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of 
regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the 
nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence 
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of all spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state of things in 
which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some 
degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to 
the growth of habit.” 
Thus the world is not a machine driven by absolute exact laws, but a system that 
manifests and  develops  new regularities or habits through Thirdness, as is 
Peirce’s paradigmatic concepts. He continues: 
 The tendency to form habits or tendency to generalize is something which 
grows by its own action, by the habit of taking habits itself growing. Its first 
germs arose from pure chance. There were slight tendencies to obey rules 
that had been followed, and these tendencies were rules which were more 
and more obeyed by their own action. There were also slight tendencies to 
do otherwise than previously, and these destroyed themselves. To be sure, 
they would sometimes be strengthened by the opposite tendency, but the 
stronger they became the more they would tend to destroy themselves…. 
Thus a small tendency to take habits grows by itself and will make other habits. In 
systems thinking and non-equilibrium thermodynamics we call it self-organization. 
But, what then is this tendency to take habit? Is it a pure mechanical material 
thing? Peirce continues: 
I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose matter 
is merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every 
physical process can be reversed without violation of the law of mechanics, 
the law of habit forbids such reversal. Accordingly, time may have been 
evolved by the action of habit…..  
Thus Peirce has a un-mechanical theory of irreversible evolution like Prigogine 
and Stengers (1985). Peirce further he believes in a continuity theory of matter 
and mind.  It is a continuum theory where mind is dominant in the one end and 
matter in the other. But when we only see matter there is still mind inside in this 
hylozoist theory that is close to Aristotle’s original view. But Aristotle did not 
have the same kind of evolutionary theory as Peirce did. He continues. 
The first chaos consisted in an infinite multitude of unrelated feelings. As 
there was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, a powder of 
feelings. It was worse than that, for of particles of powder some are nearer 
together, others farther apart, while these feelings had no relations, for 
relations are general. Now you must not ask me what happened first. This 
would be as absurd as to ask what is the smallest finite number. But 
springing away from the infinitely distant past to a very very distant past, 
we find already evolution had been going on for an infinitely long time. But 
this "time" is only our way of saying that something had been going on. 
There was no real time so far as there was no regularity, but there is no 
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more falsity in using the language of time than in saying that a quantity is 
zero. In this chaos of feelings, bits of similitude had appeared, been 
swallowed up again. Had reappeared by chance. A slight tendency to do 
otherwise than previously, and these destroyed themselves. To be sure, 
they would sometimes be strengthened by the opposite tendency, but the 
stronger they became the more they would tend to destroy themselves…. 
But the Chaos of Firstness is not consisting of dead forces and laws as it has an 
element of feeling awareness. Still it is physical, but in a much broader concept 
than mechanical materialism of classical physics. Peirce’s concept is closer to the 
original much broader Ionic concept of Physis. Peirce writes from this conception 
about the development of irreversible time: 
  I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose 
matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every 
physical process can be reversed without violation of the law of mechanics, 
the law of habit forbids such reversal. Accordingly, time may have been 
evolved by the action of habit….. The first chaos consisted in an infinite 
multitude of unrelated feelings. As there was no continuity about them, it 
was, as it were, a powder of feelings. It was worse than that, for of 
particles of powder some are nearer together, others farther apart, while 
these feelings had no relations, for relations are general. Now you must not 
ask me what happened first. This would be as absurd as to ask what is the 
smallest finite number. But springing away from the infinitely distant past 
to a very very distant past, we find already evolution had been going on for 
an infinitely long time. But this "time" is only our way of saying that 
something had been going on. There was no real time so far as there was 
no regularity, but there is no more falsity in using the language of time 
than in saying that a quantity is zero. In this chaos of feelings, bits of 
similitude had appeared, been swallowed up again. Had reappeared by 
chance. A slight tendency to generalization had here and there lighted up 
and been quenched. Had reappeared, had strengthened itself. Like had 
begun to produce like. Then even pairs of unlike feelings had begun to have 
similars, and then these had begun to generalize. And thus relations of 
contiguity, that is connections other than similarities, had sprung up. All 
this went on in ways I cannot now detail till the feelings were so bound 
together that a passable approximation to a real time was established. It is 
not to be supposed that the ideally perfect time has even yet been 
realized. There are no doubt occasional lacunae and derailments.” 
(Peirce: CP 8.316-18 ) 
Thus though this is based on an irreversible concept of time and evolution Peirce 
denies that a time for the origin can be determined. He is here close to Augustine 
and Einstein who both claims that the universe is made with time, rather than 
being made in time! No original cause of the universe can be determined as the 
chance of creation is there “all the time” as it comes from a layer of existence 
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that has almost no time. Today we would say that it is close to the Planck scale, 
which determines the least measurable quantity of time and length. This is thus 
Peirce’s general pragmaticistic and realistic but non-reductionist evolutionary 
world view, working from an infinite chaos of feelings as the first level of 
manifest reality in the form of a mere potentiality. A modern interpretation 
including the knowledge of quantum field physics, would have to say that this 
level must be “before” or more basic than the quantum vacuum field of virtual 
particles or  probability waves, which is still a pure materialistic conception 
though it can contain a statistical concept of information. Peirce’s idea of how 
the brute facts of resistant otherness can arise from Firstness is close to the way 
quantum field physics describe how the quantum vacuum field functions with 
virtual particles in pairs of matter and antimatter springs forth from the field for 
a short moment and then dissolve by merging with each other. But should one 
for instance come to close to the event horizon of a black hole and be swallowed 
up, the other will emerge as a manifest particle (secondness in Peirce’s 
concepts). We shall describe the ideas of Peirce more below. Let us finish this 
section with Peirce’s summary of how he views philosophy and its relation to the 
sciences: 
“ Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is Phenomenology, which 
simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon and discerns its 
ubiquitous elements, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, together 
perhaps with other series of categories. The second grand division is 
Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of 
the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, and 
Beauty. The third grand division is Metaphysics, which endeavors to 
comprehend the Reality of Phenomena. Now Reality is an affair of 
Thirdness as Thirdness, that is, in its mediation between Secondness and 
Firstness…” 
(Peirce: CP 5.121) 
It is on this philosophical basis that Peirce builds his semiotics. 
Semiotics 
Semiotics (from the Greek word for sign) is the doctrine and science of signs, their 
use and how they produce and convey meaning. It is thus a more comprehensive 
system than language itself and can therefore be used to understand language in 
relation to other forms of communication and interpretation such as non-verbal 
forms including cognition and interpretation. One can trace the origins of semiotics 
to the classical Greek period (from the medical symptomology of Hippocrates) and 
follow important developments in the middle Ages (Deely 2001). John Locke 
(re)introduces the label in the 17th century. But modern semiotics starts its 
development in the 19th century with Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) and with 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), whose paradigm is usually called semiology. 
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But today semiotics is often used as a meta-term for both. The two researchers 
were working independently of each other. Saussure never wrote a book on 
semiotics himself. His Cours de Linguistique Generale is reconstructed from 
students’ notes after Saussure's death in 1913. Nevertheless it founded modern 
linguistic theory.  Though semiotics is now the recognized term for the common 
area of Saussure’s and Peirce’s work, they differ in conceptions of sign. Saussure’s is 
dualistic and language internal, looking at language as a system. Peirce’s is triadic 
and with external realistic reference in that he combines a Representamen, with an 
Object through the creation of an Interpretant constructed by the observing 
system.  
Let us look at nine different examples of signs and discuss the difference in the 
sign concept from there. A sign stands for something for somebody in some 
aspect: 1. as the word ‘blue’ stands for a certain range of color, but also has 
come to stand for an emotional state. 2. As the flag is a sign for the nation (a 
symbol). 3. As a shaken fist can be a sign of anger. 4. As the red spots on the skin 
can be a sign for German measles (Rubella) 5. As the wagging of the dog’s tail can 
be a sign of friendliness towards both dogs and humans. 6. As pheromones can 
be a sign of heat to the other gender of the species. 7. As the hormone Oxytocine 
from the pituitary can be a sign to the cells in lactating glands of the breast to 
release milk.  
 
Semiologians would usually not accept examples 4-6 as genuine signs, because 
they are not self-consciously intentional human acts of communication. But 
Peirce’s triadic, pragmaticistic, transdisciplinary, evolutionary doctrine of signs 
accepts also non-consciously-intentional signs in humans  and between animals 
(nr. 5 and 6) as well as between animals and humans (nr. 4), non-intentional 
signs (nr. 4), and signs between organs and cells in the body (nr. 7) for instance 
as  immunosemiotics dealing with the immunological code, immunological 
memory and recognition.  
The development of semiotics to a transdisciplinary scientific field is mostly based 
on Peirce’s triadic evolutionary and pragmaticistic semiotics. Although semiotics 
emerged in efforts to investigate scientifically how signs function in culture, the 20th 
century has witnessed efforts to extend semiotic theory into the non-cultural 
realm, primarily in relation to living systems and computers. As Peirce’s semiotics is 
the only one that deals systematically with non-intentional signs of the body and of 
nature at large, it has become the main source for semiotic contemplations of the 
similarities and differences of sign of inorganic nature, signs of the living systems, 
signs of machines (Nöth 2002 and 2009) and the cultural and linguistic signs of 
humans living together in a society when we search for information and 
knowledge. 
A sign - in its broadest Peircean definition – is then: Anything that stands for 
something for somebody in some respect or capacity in certain situations in a 
certain way.  A sign – or a Representamen - is a medium for the communication of a 
form in a triadic relation. The Representamen refers to its Object, which determines 
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it and to its Interpretant, without being itself affected. The Interpretant is the 
interpretation in form of a more developed sign in the mind of the interpreting 
receiving mind or quasi mind. The Representamen could be for example a moving 
hand that refers to an Object (the concept of waving) for an Interpretant that is the 
interpretation in my mind materializing as the more developed sign ‘waving’, which 
is a cultural convention and therefore a symbol (se below).  
All kinds of alphabets are composed of signs. Signs are mostly imbedded in a sign 
system based on codes (se below) like for instance alphabets of natural and 
artificial languages or ritualized behavior of animals where fixed action patterns like 
feeding the young in Gulls can get a sign character when used in the mating game. 
This last aspect from ethology was included under zoösemiotics by Thomas Sebeok 
in the 1960s (Sebeok 1965 a, b), which then started to encompass animal’s species-
specific communication systems and their signifying behavior under the name 
zoösemiotics in 1972, resulting in the book Perspectives in Zoösemiotics.  
Later Sebeok decided that zoösemiotics rests on a more comprehensive science of 
biosemiotics, a name that was coined in the beginning of the 1990s (Sebeok and 
Umiker-Sebeok 1992). This global conception of semiotics equates life with sign 
interpretation and mediation and a view of semiotic that encompasses all living 
systems including plants (Krampen 1981), bacteria and cells, for instance in the 
human body (called endosemiotics  by Uexküll et. al. 1993).  According to one 
standard scheme for the broad classification of organisms, five super kingdoms are 
now distinguished: protists; bacteria; plants; animals; and fungi, thus the major 
classification categories in biosemiotics are: bacteriosemiotics, protistosemiotics, 
phytosemiotics, mycosemiotics, and zoosemiotics. Within zoosemiotic antropose-
miotics encompasses the traditional semiotics of language and culture mostly 
inspired by Saussure, but it is built on the foundations of the other levels 
mentioned, which is not present in structuralist semiology. 
 
Ever since Umberto Eco (1976) formulated the problem of the “semiotic 
threshold” keeping semiotics within the cultural sciences, semiotics - especially 
Peircean semiotics - has developed further into the realm of biology crossing 
threshold after threshold into the sciences. The ethology developed by Lorenz 
(1970-71) and Tinbergen (1973) from the 1920’th and on (inspired by Jacob von 
Uexküll) has for long pointed out that animals do react to certain aspect of 
nature or other animals as signs to be interpreted in fixed action patterns, and 
that animals communicate with these in a ritualized form that gives some of 
them a symbolic character (Brier 2008a).  The efforts of Thomas Sebeok (see for 
instance Sebeok 1965 a+b, 1989, 1990, Sebeok and Danesi 2000, Sebeok and 
Umiker-Sebeok 1992) and Hoffmeyer (1996 and 2008) as well as Emmeche 
(Emmeche1998 + Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 1991) have led to the development 
of a biosemiotics encompassing all living systems, including plants (Krampen 
1981) and micro-organisms as sign generators and users (Nöth 2001). This many 
humanistic researchers find hard to accept, and accuse Peirce of defining the 
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concept of sign too broadly by going outside intentional communication 
(Sonnesson 2009). 
 
Resulting developments have then been deployed to change the scope of 
semiotics from only cultural communication to a Biosemiotics that also 
encompasses the cognition and communication of all living systems from the 
inside of cells to the whole biosphere and a Cybersemiotics (Brier 2008 a) which 
in addition encompasses a theory of information systems as biological, 
psychological and social autopoietic (Luhmann 1990 and 1995).  
 
Biosemiotics 
Biosemiotics (bios=life & semion=sign) is a growing field that studies the 
production, action and interpretation of signs, such as sounds, objects, smells, 
movements but also signs on molecular scales in an attempt to integrate the 
findings of biology and semiotics to form a new view of life and meaning as 
immanent features of the natural world. Life and genuine semiosis are seen as 
co-existing. The biology of recognition, memory, categorization, mimicry, 
learning and communication are of interest for biosemiotic research, together 
with the analysis of the application of the tools and notions of semiotics such as 
interpretation, semiosis, types of sign and meaning. The biosemiotic doctrine 
accepts non-consciously-intentional signs in humans, non-intentional signs, also 
between animals as well as between animals and humans, and signs between 
organs and cells in the body and between cells in the body or in nature. Thus the 
biological processes between and within animals transcend the conceptual 
foundation of the other natural sciences. Many biosemioticians base their 
research on parts of Peirce’s semiotics (Brier 2009). 
 
There has been a well-known debate about the concepts of primary and 
secondary modeling systems (see e.g., Sebeok and Danesi 2000) in linguistics 
that has now been changed by biosemiotics. Originally language was seen as the 
primary modeling system, whereas culture comprises the secondary one. But 
through biosemiotics Sebeok has argued that there exists a zoösemiotic system 
as the foundation of human language, which has to be called the primary one, 
thus language becomes the secondary, and culture the tertiary system. 
Biosemiotics now has its own journal Biosemiotics and a books series at 
Springer’s; this new area is still controversial for many cultural and linguistic 
semioticians as is the broadening of the concept of code. 
 
The concept of code 
A code is a set of transformation rules whereby messages are converted from 
one form of representation to another like in cryptography or Morse code. Thus, 
by code is very broadly meant everything of a more systematic nature - “rules” - 
that the source and the receiver must know a priori about a sign for it to 
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correlate processes and structures between two different areas, as for instance 
the Morse code. But now the term code – for some without meaning and 
interpretation inspired by information theory - is also introduced at the level of 
cells because a more local concept of connecting order than universal laws was 
needed. The advantage of using the concept of code over law is because codes in 
contrast to universal laws only work in specific contexts, and interpretation is 
based on more or less conventional rules be they cultural or (here is the 
extension) biological, such as the DNA-code.  
 
In the protein production system including the genome in the nucleus, the RNA 
molecules going in and out of the nucleus, and the Ribosomes outside the 
nucleus membrane triplet base pairs in the DNA can be translated to a 
(messenger) RNA- molecule and then read by the Ribosome as a code for amino 
acids to string together in a specific sequence to make a specific protein. Thus 
Sebeok (1992) writes of the genetic code as well as of the metabolic, the neural 
and the verbal code. Thus living systems are self-organized not only on the basis 
of natural laws but on codes developed in the course of evolution. In the overall 
code can often be sub-codes grouped in a hierarchy. To view something as 
encoded is to interpret it as-sign-ment (Sebeok 1992). Thus, in most biosemiotics 
the concept of code is always connected to meaningful semiosis, though not in 
Barbieri’s “code-semiotics”.  Information science on the other hand is built 
“bottom up” and is not based on concepts of meaning and interpretation. Thus 
the code concept in biosemiotics has landed in a tug-of-war situation. 
 
A symbol in Peircean semiotics is a sign where the code is conventionally and 
arbitrarily defined. It can be a word in common language, but gestures and things 
like flags, presidents, and specific events like a soccer match can be symbols 
(here for example of national pride). Biosemioticians claim that the concept of 
symbol goes beyond cultures, as some animals have signs that are “shifters”. This 
points to the fact that their meaning changes with situations, as for instance the 
feeding behaviour of young by adults, which also appears as a behavioural 
sequence in the mating game or  the head-tossing of the herring gull, which also 
occurs both as a pre-coital display but also when the female is begging for food 
(Sebeok 1965 a).  
 
Now here it is not the individual that is the interpretant but the species or 
breeding line. Such a transdisciplinary broadening of the concept of a symbol is a 
challenging development for many linguists and semioticians working only with 
human culture and language. For instance Zlatev (2009 a and b) works on 
developing a hierarchy of sign levels. 
 
Life can be understood from a chemical point of view as auto-catalytic, 
autonomous, autopoietic systems, but that does not say much about how 
individual biological self and awareness appears in the nervous systems. 
Hormones and transmitters do not in the living system function only on a 
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physical causal basis. Not even the chemical pattern fitting formal causation is 
enough to explain how sign molecules function, because their effect is 
temporally, situational and individually contextualized. Sign molecules like 
hormones and neurotransmitters work also on a basis of final causation 
supporting a purpose in the survival of the self-organized biological self. As 
Sebeok (1992) points out, the mutual coding of sign molecules from the nervous, 
the hormone and the immune system is an important part of the self-organizing 
of a biological self, which again is in constant recursive interaction with its 
Umwelt (Uexküll 1934). 
 
This produces a view of nerve cell communication based on a Peircian world view 
binding the physical efficient causation described through the concept of energy, 
the chemical formal causation described through the concept of information 
with the final causations in biological systems described through the concept of 
semiosis (Brier 2008 a) on the basis of connecting Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness.  
From a Cybersemiotic point of view, information science’s bit or basic difference is 
only a sign if it is “..a difference that makes a difference”. Bits working in the 
computer for the computer are not signs in themselves as they do not need living 
system with final causation to interpret them. They work through formal causation 
that is the interaction through differences and patterns. The computer is a 
“differences machine”, a duality based system.  
As Peirce’s sign is triadic, a Cybersemiotics based on his semiotics include 
information, and bits as only pre or quasi signs in themselves (Nöth 2001, 2002 and 
2008). Codes inside a computer used by the computer is viewed as proto-sign as 
they are dyadic and do not require a self-organized “quasi-mind or self” to have 
causal effect, but work like a key in a lock. But when we see them as encoding for 
language in a word processor program, they are signs for us. 
Sign making is thus immanent in nature, but manifest only in full triadic semiosis 
within living systems. The informational level is seen as intermediary between the 
physical world of energy, matter, and forces and the semiotic world. 
Cybersemiotics has so far sided with biosemiotics in not accepting a full-fledged 
pan-semiotics, but presents a compromise through an evolutionary model.  
A Cybersemiotic theory of emergence 
I have argued through the article that we have not yet arrived at a well-functioning 
and consistent theory of emergence. See for instance El-Hani (2008), where the 
need for a shift to process ontology or to Peircean semiotic philosophy is suggested 
as ways out of this serious problem.The more quantum physical aspects are worked 
out in Penrose (1995) and Stapp (2007). Baer (2010) attempts to combine quantum 
physics and process philosophy in his discussion of the physics of consciousness. 
This lack of a good theory of emergence is a problem, as the task of such a theory is 
to explain how the qualities of life and sense experience and therefore qualia plus 
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the next step to linguistic born self-consciousness in humans living in a culture can 
be created in the course of evolution. I have pointed out that not even complexity 
theory combined with non-equilibrium thermodynamics and theories of self-
organization, even including autocatalysis and autopoiesis in a monistic and realistic 
setting, perhaps combined with general system theory where there is a holistic 
belief that the whole is more than the sum of the parts, can explain how the ability 
to experience and be aware of oneself and the environment can happen. I cannot 
deny that some computer science philosophers like Arrabales, Ledezma and 
Sanchis (2010) actually believe that there are small beginnings of consciousness in 
the form of agency in AI robots, and try to make scales to measure them. I find it 
highly unlikely that we are in any way near stages in development of AI and AL, 
where life worlds might emerge. So, the cybersemiotic view of the relation 
between information and semiosis is that information belongs to Secondness, and 
must be considered protosemiotic. When going into Thirdness, the possibility of an 
interpretant appears, as Peirce underlines, and as Varela shows in his calculus of 
self-reference. But there are certain conditions for a system to be able to create an 
interpretant within our space and time frame that must be met first. One of them is 
the closure and self-organization of autopoiesis in a living system, in order to be 
able to create an interpretant within our space and time frame. But we probably 
need to add more. Hoffmeyer (1998) describes four additional steps necessary for 
the creation of living systems: 
 
1. The establishment of an inside-outside asymmetry (closed surface).  
2. A proto-communication over those surfaces (a community of surfaces).  
3. A digital re-description in the form of DNA to carry on the form of the 
organism in procreation (Hoffmeyer and Emmeche (1991) call it code-
duality).  
4. The formation of an interface (inside-outside loops) is essential for the 
creation of interpretants.  
Machines lack autopoiesis, reproduction, code-duality, and an inner organization of 
membranes (Hoffmeyer 1998), and thus also lack both individual-based and 
species-based motivation and intentionality, and consequently also the ability to 
establish a genuine interpretant. Therefore I think that instead somehow we must 
enlarge the conceptual framework within which we conduct science, if we want to 
form connections with the phenomenological aspects of reality and the experiences 
of meaning. It is my belief as I have argued here that Peirce’s triadic semiotics 
deliver a possible first steps towards such a solution. 
On the level of organic and cognitive evolution, Hoffmeyer has in his development 
of a biosemiotics, built on an approximation to Peirce’s ontology, suggested adding 
a new level of meaning to the reductionistic Darwinian "survival of the fittest". This 
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survival idea tells a lot about rather primitive organism, but there must be 
something more as we get to more and more complicated organisms with nervous 
systems. Neither maximal dissipation of entropy nor survival is enough to explain 
the growth of systems with inner worlds of qualia. What is it that they acquire more 
of? Hoffmeyer suggests calling it semiotic freedom and explains it this way: 
 
"The most pronounced feature of organic evolution is not the creation of a 
multiplicity of amazing morphological structures, but the general expansion 
of 'semiotic freedom', that is to say the increase in richness or 'depth' of 
meaning that can be communicated"  
(Hoffmeyer 1996: 61). 
It is a very crucial point that Hoffmeyer tends to here, because this is where the 
possibility of meaning comes into an enlarged framework where science is also 
possible on a basis that is close to Prigogine’s complexity theory for 
thermodynamics, but adding the Peircean framework and his theory of mind. The 
play of signs in the freedom of consciousness becomes an attractor in cosmogony 
and evolution. 
Connecting this to the problem of emotion and inner reward in ethology that 
Lorenz could not solve within his standard materialistic biological framework, and 
by using von Uexküll’s Umwelt-concept in an evolutionary context7, cybersemiotics 
regards the Umwelt as a sphere of signification (signification sphere), created by 
every living system, as the primary living space (life word). What ecologists call the 
ecological niche in the habitat becomes a meaningful sphere, a signification sphere 
for the living system. Seen from an ecosemiotic view it is a semiotic niche, as 
Hoffmeyer calls it.  
The production of meaning is thus brought into what mechanicism sees as “dead” 
nature by the concepts of Firstness and Synechism combined with Hylozoism and 
the development of the universe through three different kinds of evolution: 
1. Thycistic evolution (free or random variation, sometimes called fortuitous) 
like Darwin’s natural selection.  
2. Ananchastic evolution (dynamic dyadic interactions, a more mechanical 
necessity). It comes closest to Hegel’s idea of evolution. 
3. Agapastic evolution or "Evolutionary Love" (combining the free variation 
and dyadic interactions trough habit formation by the mediating ability of 
Thirdness). This comes closest to Lamarck’s idea of evolution (Brent 1998: 
215). 
                                                 
7
 Jacob von Uexküll did not believe in evolution, so his theory did not include evolution in its 
foundational framework 
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Life can be understood from a chemical point of view as auto-catalytic, 
autonomous, autopoietic systems, but that does not say much about how 
individual awareness appears in nervous systems. On the basis of Peirce’s 
philosophy, the emergence of signs and meaning in the living world is to be 
expected. It is also clear that the world in its vague beginnings was not created with 
signs as we understand them in biosemiotics, but only a tendency to make them 
emerge through the law of mind. This could be called a vague tendency to final 
causation that evolved from the tendency to form habits.  
The Cybersemiotic interpretation of causality based on Peirce is that efficient 
causation can exist on its own as Secondness, but it is often found embedded in the 
formal causations of pattern fitting and signals described in information science and 
then in the living world clearly by final causation, which becomes conscious 
purpose in human society. Information seen as both protosemiosis, in evolution, 
and quasi-semiosis, when embedded in semiotic and linguistic processes, is 
between the two. It is connected to formal causation and works through signals 
and dualities of patterns, not yet a fully triadic semiosis, but still above the brute 
force of efficient causation. 
The heterarchical levels of evolutionary cybersemiotic emergence 
The cybersemiotic approach that I present here unites cybernetic, systemic, 
informational, and semiotic approaches towards self-organization, intentionality, 
selection of differences, and constructivism, thus avoiding solipsism and idealism. 
Modern systems thinking views nature as containing multilevel, multidimensional 
hierarchies of inter-related clusters forming a heterogeneous general hierarchy of 
processual structures: A hierarchy.  
Levels are believed to emerge through emergent processes, when new holons 
appear through higher-level organization. I have been skeptical about the ability of 
this paradigm to account for the emergence of life and sense experience and later 
linguistic borne self-consciousness. But if this system and cybernetic view is placed 
into a Peircean framework, where living potentialities (Firstness) are processes 
manifested through constraints and forces (Secondness) into regularities and 
patterns (Thirdness) in a recursive manner from level to level, it makes much more 
sense. The new emergent level then acts as a potential for the development of the 
next level. Levels can form and dissolve when their dynamical parameters are near 
critical points. Stabilization requires that the system moves further from the critical 
point into organizing patterns, like energy wells. But one then has to accept a 
hylozoist view of matter as Hylé. 
In hierarchies there is a filtering of lower-level effects rising from the bottom at 
each new emergent level. There is also a binding from the top, and the exclusion of 
alternative possibilities, once one path of emergence has stabilized (Downward 
causation). Across levels, various forms of causation (Efficient: based on energy 
transfer, Formal: based on pattern recognition, signals, and information, and Final: 
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based on meaningful purpose and thus semiotic) are more or less explicit 
(manifest). This leads to more or less explicit manifestations of information and 
semiotic meaning at the various levels in the world of energy and matter. The basic 
forms of causation can be seen at all levels. Material causation is basically grounded 
in the Quantum vacuum fields. But for each level of material-informational 
manifestation the lower level beneath it acts as its material basis. 
Emergent process laws are peculiar to each level, allowing components to function 
together, and stabilizing levels in pattern-formation and structure that can be 
described with an objective information concept. This yields the dynamical 
integration that individuates each level. In the special case in which this integration 
involves active organizational processes we have autonomy, which through 
autocatalytic closure creates agency. It seems that total closure, as in autopoiesis, is 
important in the creation of living systems and the emergent quality of individuality 
laying the foundation for subjectivity. 
Meaning is generated through the whole heterarchy, especially through the 
relations of individual systems to a larger natural or social context. Thus, meaning is 
generated both on the individual levels of the living or humans and in social 
systems. But meaning is most manifest in the living systems that fulfill Hoffmeyer’s 
conditions. The most full-blown version of meaning involves finality in a self-
conscious social-linguistic mind. 
But starting from dissipative systems, one can define a heterarchy of pre-living self-
organized systems as based on degrees of closure, asymmetry between inside and 
outside, proto-communication over membranes, digital representation, and 
formation of interfaces. 
 
The ontological basis of Cybersemiotics: 
Information theory is now an important part of the new science of consciousness 
research program, but there is a lot of work to do for serious philosophy, 
considering how many central philosophical topics of mind, language, 
epistemology, and metaphysics are going to be affected by the biosemiotic 
development. Peircean biosemiotics may contribute to a new transdisciplinary 
framework in understanding knowledge, consciousness, meaning and 
communication. But to do this, new elements has to be integrated making it 
possible to unite the functionalistic approaches to information and 
communication coming from cybernetics and computer science with the 
semantic pragmatic approaches coming from the linguistic turn and semiotics. 
Concepts of closure, self-organization, and differentiation of biological, 
psychological, and social systems developed in second-order cybernetics and 
autopoiesis theory need to be integrated into theories of embodiment and 
Peircean biosemiotics.   
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Let us try to summarize and schematize the basic ontological concepts of 
Cybersemiotics made be an integration of Peirce’s semiotic philosophy: 
 
1. The first level of quantum vacuum fields entangled causality is not 
considered physically dead as usually done in physicalistic physics. 
Cybersemiotics conceives it as a part of Firstness, which also holds qualia 
and pure feeling. Although physicist may be bothered by this new 
metaphysical understanding of this level of reality, they cannot claim that 
there is no room for new interpretations, because physics has a complete 
understanding of it. On the contrary, this is one of the most mysterious 
levels of reality we have encountered, and its implications have been 
discussed since the 1930’s and were central in the disputes between Bohr 
and Einstein. Now the entanglement is attempted exploited for the 
possibility of teleportation and the first positive results claimed. 
 
2. The second level of efficient causation is clearly what Peirce describes as 
Secondness. This realm is ontologically dominated by physics as classical 
kinematics and thermodynamics. But for Peirce it is also the willpower of 
mind. 
 
3. The third level of information is where the formal causation manifests 
clearly and where the regularities and Thirdness becomes crucial for 
interactions through stable patterns that are yet only protosemiotic. This 
level is ontologically dominated by the chemical sciences and concepts of 
pattern fitting. This difference in ontological character may be one of the 
keys to understand the differences between physics and chemistry. It is 
not only a matter of complexity but also of organization and type of 
predominant causality. 
 
4. On the fourth level, where life has self-organized, the actual semiotic 
interactions emerge. First internally in multi-cellular organisms as 
‘endosemiotics’ and between organism as ‘sign games’, this framework – 
based on biosemiotics –  points out that the informational concept may 
be useful at the chemical level of analyzing life, but it is not sufficient to 
capture the communicative, dynamic organizational closure of living 
systems. This is one of the reasons why Maturana and Varela do not want 
to use the information concept in their explanations of the dynamics of 
life and. But they do not use a semiotic either. 
 
5. Finally on the fifth level with syntactic language games, human self-
consciousness emerges and with that rationality, logical thinking and 
creative inferences (intelligence). Intelligence is closely connected to 
abduction and conscious finality. Abduction is crucial to signification. It is 
the ability to see something as a sign for something else. This something 
else has to be a habit of nature. Some kind of regularity or stability in 
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nature that the mind can recognize as somewhat lawful is necessary for it 
to be a fairly stable eigen value in the mind (an interpretant). 
 
The cybersemiotic approach explains this through a semiotized version of 
Luhmann’s triple autopoietic theory of communication combined with pragmatic 

























































Figure1: Cybersemiotic model classifying different types of semiosis and proto-
semiotic processes: The model is a cybersemiotic development of the Luhmann 
model shown in figure one. The localization of the processes have nothing to do 
with the actual bodily locations (as the head, for instance, is also a part of the 
biological autopoiesis), and have endosemiotic processes. To limit the complexity, 
I have placed all the cybernetic-autopoietic concepts on the left person and all the 
semiotic ones at the person to the right. But all concepts concern both persons. 
Each person is placed in a signification sphere. When these are combined through 
socio-communicative autopoietic language games a common signification sphere 
of culture is created. One part of ecosemiotics signification is based on the 
linguistic processes of conceptualization and classifications. Underneath 
language games is the biological level of instinctually based sign games, and 
under that, the cybernetic languaging game of the coordination of coordination 
of behavior (of two black boxes). Thus, ecosemiotics also has a level of bio-
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psychological or emphatic signification, as well as a level of structural couplings, 
which the organism, or rather the species, has developed through evolution. 
Although the figure does not seem very simplified it is even more so, as it 
combines several simplified figures. But it functions as a tool to view the relations 
between the different levels of semiosis. Combining this with a general systems 
theory of emergence, self-organization and closure/ autopoiesis it constitutes an 
explicit theory of how the inner world of organism is constituted and therefore 
how first person’s views are possible and as real as matter.  This produces a view 
of nerve cell communication based on a Peircean world view binding the physical 
efficient causation described through the concept of energy, the chemical formal 
causation described through the concept of information with the final causations 
in biological systems described through the concept of semiosis.  Developed from 
Brier (2008a). 
 
Thus semiotic autopoietic social and cultural communicative praxis become the 
epistemological center of our understanding of ourselves as autopoietic 
embodied brain-borne self-conscious intersubjective beings situated in language 
and environment. From this situation we develop knowledge about us self ad 
conscious being, on society, language and culture to understand out 
intersubjectivity and about our body hood and finally the environment. These 
become the four specializing aspects of Wissenschaft. 
 
The four views in the Cybersemiotics star 
My theory and philosophy of science is then that in a total naturalism all the four 
approaches to understand cognition, communication, meaning and 
consciousness – from exact natural sciences, from the life sciences, from 
phenomenological-hermeneutic interpretational humanities and from the 
sociological discursive-linguistic view – are all equally important and have to be 
united in a transdisciplinary theory of information, semiotics, first person 
consciousness and an intersubjective cultural social-communicative approach. 
The model in figure 4 called the Cybersemiotic star below illustrates this. It is also 
based on that the prerequisite of producing intersubjective knowledge such as 
Wissenschaft is to accept the reality of language, autopoietic embodied minds, 
culture and non-cultural environment, while at the same time pointing to that 
the discussion about transdisciplinary knowledge is done in a semiotic-linguistic 
discourse with other embodied and linguistically informed consciousnesses in a 
common praxis in non-cultural and cultural signification sphere. From this 
interaction springs four main sphere of knowledge interest: 1. The first person 
knowledge interest of the origin and function of mind and subjectivity in this 
personal life as the phenomenological investigating of the life world in a 
Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, which in a Peircean semiotic 
phaneroscophy become in intersubjective signification sphere. When we are 
studying socio-communication and acting from the point of language, we are 
acting in meaningful language studying other meaningful language. As 
Signs vol. 5 (2011): pp. 75-111, 2011  
ISSN: 1902-8822 
98 
Wittgensetin (1958) argues then there are no private languages or language 
games and we can add there are no private sign games either and all knowledge 
comes through signs. But it is emerging from the center born as an unrestricted 
absolute naturalism, which makes it impossible this or any of the other 
approaches to knowledge to claim that they make a model of all of nature.  
 
In the first person approach, which are usually called phenomenological but 
which we here with Pierce will call phaneroscopic, we deal with consciousness 
impressions and expressions as the processes of sense experience and thinking in 
a state before sciences has divided the world in subjects and objects bur still 
within a triadic semiotics. It is the subjective and intersubjectively shared first 
person experiental consciousness, as its own first cause, for Peirce semiotically 
based. Consciousness is not viewed as a product of the brain or of culture and 
language neither in Peirce or Husserl. All perception is embedded in 
consciousness in even so rudimentary form as pure feeling in Firstness. There is 
no theoretical interest in looking for something more original (material) “behind” 
the semiotically sense experience in a reality of potential signs. To do so one has 
to redefine the world by splitting it into a subjective and an objective aspect and 
then concentrate ones investigations on the objective site. This is what science 
does and in its endeavour it tends to forget the unity, from which it started it 
epistemological project. In eliminative materialism as well as eliminative 
informationalism it evens denies this original (triadic) unity (or life world), from 









































Figure 2: The Cybersemiotic star: A diagram of how the communicative social 
system of embodied minds’ four main areas of knowledge arises. Physical nature 
is usually explained as originating in energy and matter sometimes also 
information, living systems as emerging from the development of life processes 
(such as the first cell). Social culture is explained as founded on the development 
of meaning and power in language and practical habits, and finally our inner 
mental world is explained as deriving from the development of our individual life 
world and consciousness, in spiritual and religious framework often ultimately 
from an objective transcendental spirit or as a soul coming from a personal 
creator God. But none of them is specifically intended here. 
 
 
We are thus immersed on conscious communication forms be they verbal or 
non-verbal. As the linguistic turn argues, we cannot get out of language and 
thereby culture and power. Even science becomes as social construction, which 
is historically true, as there as been longer times in culture where we did not 
have science than there has been with science. Empirical and mathematically 
grounded science is a rather modern invention that really started in the 
Renaissance. Scientific knowledge has formed our rationality and cultural 
outlook on the world up to the global discussion these days about the reality of 
global warming.  




The socio-communicative “sciences” are based on the basic belief that all 
knowledge is created through intersubjective discourses, which has spawned  
social constructivistic paradigms believing that we  more or less creates nature 
and our view of us self through our discontinuous developing discourses. 
Structuralism and Marxism for instance considers the human subjects as having 
very little causal effect on human practise that is primary seen as guided by 
social and cultural-linguistic patterns and forces. 
 
Peirce’s semiotics has that in common with Critical Rationalism and Critical 
Realism that it understands that humans creates knowledge together in a 
mixture of language and praxis, but it is not a pure constructivism as it recognises 
that empirical testing of theories and our own root through evolution in the self 
same reality we are investigating, do have considerable influence on forming the 
scientific knowledge which is the result of the process. 
 
Though we need the belief in an ultimate truth and has truth as an ethical 
commitment in Wissenshaft; we are also aware that their can be no final proof of 
our knowledge being a universal true statement or model. It is as Kant says “a 
regulative idea”. Thus the model has a constructing movement going one way 
from the social and phenomenological and on the other hand empirical 
perturbations from the pragmatic aspect of reality. These two interact through 
time and make our knowledge system develop to be more and more 
encompassing. 
 
There are three forms of historical explanations going on : 1. The cosmological, 2. 
The Biological, 3. The historical. The natural science work towards making this 
one grand historical explanation, but so far we have not cracked the problem of 
the emergence life and consciousness in evolution, so we until that we might 
have to accept that an all encompassing explanation of the conscious meaningful 
human communication process cannot be provided from any of the corners of 
the model. We cannot reduce our scientific explanations to one grand story, but 
have to juggle with all four at the same time. Brier, S. (2009a): “Cybersemiotic 
Pragmaticism and Constructivism.” I have connected my view of Peirce’s 
pragmaticism and second order cybernetics and showed how it establishes an 
alternative to radical constructivism I am drawing on Bhaskar’s (1997 and 98) 
Critical Realism, where he is also inspired by Peirce as well as Marx. Since the 
publication of his A Realist Theory of Science in 1975, critical realism is defending 
the critical and emancipatory potential of rational (scientific and philosophical) 
enquiry and is – like Cybersemiotics - offering a real alternative to both 
positivism and post modernism and is still developing its view.  
In establishing a new framework, I also hope to create a third culture, one that 
transcends the incommensurability between C.P. Snow's two cultures: science-
technology, and the humanities versus social sciences. But so far it has all been 
about wissenschaft and in the final part of this article I also want to write a few 
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points about the relation between wissenschaft and other types of knowledge 
systems like religion, politics and art. I am trying to draw a map onto which a 
multitude of viewpoints can be plotted and their subject areas characterized and 
compared with other approaches. By erecting this framework, I hope to expand 
the dialogue between sciences, the humanities, the social sciences, philosophy, 
and the existential quest to broaden our concept of reason in accordance with 
my stance towards making common frames for the open and systematic pursuits 
of knowledge and meaning. 
 
Towards a third culture 
All the above-mentioned insights about language indicate that we are the 
autopoietic systems in which language emerges. We speak language, but we are 
also spoken by language. To a great degree, language carries our cultures as well 
as our theories of the world and of ourselves. As individuals, we are programmed 
with language – to learn a language is to learn a culture. As such, pre-linguistic 
children are only potentially human beings, as they have to be linguistically 
programmed in order to become the linguistic animal cyborgs, we call human. 
Yet, we do not have to be slaves of that (one culture) since we can learn more 
languages, and we reflect on common language with specially developed 
languages, such as scientific or poetic language. 
 
However, getting behind language as such is difficult. Zen Buddhism, for 
instance, cultivates such techniques through the paradoxes of the koans. Other 
systems do it by going beyond linguistic meaning in meditation. Members of 
different religious systems spend long periods in silence and seclusion as a 
means to expand consciousness beyond language, or maybe to just become 
more aware of what goes on underneath language in emotions and biological 
motivations that also are in play behind our linguistic self-consciousness.  
 
I suggest that culture builds up a view of what is real and what is not, what is 
manifest and what is not. I put these four decisions into a square inspired by 
Greimas’ squarei. We thus start with real phenomena of which some can be 
handled directly and some are working behind the scenes, such as the laws of 
nature or animal spirits, invisible and blind watchmakers. See Figure 5. 




Figure 4: The first circle developed and inspired by Greimas’ semiotic square, 
consists of two pairs of opposites combined. Objects can be characterized by their 
being and manifestation. True objects have both. Fictional and mythological 
beings have none. The figures can be found in Brier (2008a). 
 
The real and manifest in our culture are primarily considered to be natural 
’things’ or ‘objects’ (res). What is not real and not manifest is the ‘no thing’ like 
the Godhead, the emptiness, the empty set, zero, the vacuum field and so on. 
Manifest cultural objects are not real, like natural objects. They are fictional. This 
goes for pieces of art and even the architecture of buildings and machines, 
although the parts they consist of are natural objects or ‘matter’. Real non-
manifest phenomena, such as the natural laws or the meaning of life are 
‘hidden’. See Figure 4. 
 





Figure 4: The second circle produces the basic objects in our culture: the real, the 
fictional, the hidden forces controlling object processes and finally the zero or 
negative basis for everything that can also be viewed as a fullness of 
potentialities as Peirce does in his concept of Firstness. 
 
To this construction, we can add some of our basic systems of knowledge 
construction. Science deals with the hidden laws behind the objects and their 
dynamics (kinematics for instance). Religion deals with the hidden that is no-
thing. Art deals with fictional objects manifest or imaginary. Politics deal with 
fictional no-thing-phenomena like democracy, human rights, and free markets. 
See Figure 5. 
 




Figure 5: The third circle explains the emergence of different kinds of knowledge 
types related to the kind of objects our culture defines in the world. They all seem 
necessary and not reducible to each other. The sciences deal with the hidden 
order behind the dynamics of objects. Religion deals with the hidden non-
material forces and order that some presume govern our existence. Art deals with 
the production of fictional objects and politics is the creation of a non-material 
collective of fictional goals like democracy and a sustainable society. 
                                                                                                                
We are developing a Third Culture, which will go beyond that fundamental spilt 
which there has been between the world of science and technology and the 
world of the humanities and the arts. The third culture reveals that science and 
art share creative aspects. This is why we now increasingly use the term 
“knowledge production” instead of the discovery of truth or facts. We have come 
full circle now in our culture after positivism by realizing that both religion and 
science have metaphysical assumptions or frameworks behind them, paradigms 
if you like. 
 
We have also learned that our basic attitude of relating to and caring about 
reality and the living beings in it, as well as our search for meaning and ethics, 
are fundamental parts of the existentiality of a conscious individual in a body and 
a culture. The idea is that this non-reductionists cybersemiotic view of absolute 
naturalism opens up for other knowledge types as necessary complementary 
views to understand and handle “human knowing”. Among them is the spiritual 
as it for instance developed by Roy Bhaskar (2002) in his book series Meta Reality 
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and the integral paradigm which Ken Wilber develops and which is expanded on 
in Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael E. Zimmerman’s book:  Integral Ecology: 
Uniting Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World.  Peirce sees both the core of 
Wissenschaft and religion as opens forms for the search for truth, beauty and 
meaning, which complement each other. I have written on this aspect in Brier, S. 
(2008c), where I compare “ Bateson and Peirce on the pattern that connects and 
the sacred” and in  (2008d), where I point to how Peirce’s metaphysics 
establishes a  relation between mysticism and science through his panentheism 
calling it “ A Peircean Panentheist Scientific Mysticism”.  Spirituality is the 
concept chosen to signify this intentionality that gives rise to political and 
religious, as well as scientific pursuits. 
 
Finally, arts and politics join forces in our cultural construction of social utopias. 
Presently, the global ecological as well as human and economically sustainable 
society seem to be our new utopia, as we worry about our globe’s ability to keep 
the conditions stable for our survival on this planet. See Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: The fourth circle brings forth a reflective practice to analyse and develop 
the foundation on which our thinking is based. Thus, revision and development 
are possible. This is one of the very important uses of the philosophy of science. 
This way of constructing our human and cultural knowledge system, collecting 
the four levels, leads to a model like the one shown in Figure 6. It shows how the 
different knowledge systems interact, bringing forth our ideas of utopias worth 
pursuing through our political, spiritual, philosophical and scientific systems. The 
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model is an example of Third Culture as it combines traits from art and science 
and in itself is somewhat utopian.  It is one of many ways to conceptualize these 
interaction of many types of knowledge systems that we as humans feel an urge 
to cultivate probably because none of  can cover the whole of reality for the 
simple reason that we ourselves are part of it and therefore cannot transcend it 
– at least not in words. 
As my last words I want to point out that this article gives an overview of many 
years of work., which is argued at length in my book from 2008 and in papers 
from 2007 and forward. Here much more elaborate argumentation can be found 
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i
 This model builds on presentations by Peter Voetmann Christiansen to a Mind Ship Seminar in 
Copenhagen in 1996 arranged by Tor Nørretranders. Here, the idea that I have further developed 
was sketched, and with the permission of Peter Voetmann Christensen, I have developed it further. 
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I wish to thank Peter for this and many other  inspirations over the many years he has been my 
colleague. From Brier 2008a and on I call the model the Brier-Christensen  multiple square. 
